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                             OPINION 
                                            
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Appellants, the Philadelphia Housing Authority and its housing 
management personnel, 
Floyd Baker, Pamela Dunbar, and Claude Ross (collectively "the PHA"), 
appeal the March 8, 
1996, order of the district court granting summary judgment to Laticia 
Farley, a public housing 
tenant, and denying their cross-motion for summary judgment.  The district 
court held that Farley 
had a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ordered the PHA to 
fully comply with the 
arbitration award that directed it to make repairs to Farley's apartment.  
The PHA contends that 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration 
award, and erred in holding 
that Farley had a cognizable federal cause of action under § 1983 to 
enforce a public housing 
grievance award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(k) and 1983.  We hold that 
the parties did not 
intend to limit enforcement of grievance awards to state court.  We also 
hold that Farley can 
bring a § 1983 action to enforce her federal right to implement the 
grievance procedure provided 
for in the Housing Act.    
                                I. 
      
                                A.                                           
     The United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq., was designed 
to provide 
"decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" within the financial reach of 
families of low income.  42 
U.S.C.  
§ 1437 (1994).  In order to encourage the construction and operation of 
low-income housing, the 
Act authorizes the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
provide grants, 
low-interest loans and tax exemptions to local public housing agencies 
known as PHAs.  Because 
they receive federal subsidies, the PHAs are able to charge below-market 
rent to eligible low- 
income tenants.  In exchange for receiving public funding, the local PHAs 
are required to operate 
public housing in compliance with the provisions of the Act. 
     Section 1437d(k) is the provision at issue in this appeal.  As 
amended in 1983, this 
section provides that each public housing agency must implement an 
administrative grievance 
procedure for the resolution of all tenant disputes concerning adverse PHA 
action.  It sets forth 
the grievance/arbitration procedure that the local PHAs must follow, as 
well as the rights to 
which tenants are entitled under that procedure.  
     The history of § 1437d(k) and its accompanying regulations dates back 
to 1971, when 
HUD issued a series of public housing circulars requiring the PHAs to 
recognize certain 
minimum tenant rights and provide an administrative grievance forum for 
tenant complaints 
concerning adverse PHA action.  See U.S. Dept. Of Housing and Urban 
Development Circulars 
RHM 7465.8 and 7465.9.  In 1975, HUD codified the requirements from the 
circulars in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  The circulars are currently codified in 24 
C.F.R. § 966 (1994).  
These regulations require the local PHAs to establish and implement 
grievance procedures that 
provide tenants with hearings if they dispute any PHA action or inaction 
concerning lease 
provisions or local regulations. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50, 966.51(a), 
966.53(a)(1994).  The City 
of Philadelphia's specific grievance procedure is outlined in the consent 
decree entered in Brown 
v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, No. 72-2083 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 
1974)("Brown consent 
decree"); see also Stipulation and Order Supplementing and Clarifying the 
Stipulation and Order 
of June 14, 1974, Brown v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 72-2083 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 24, 1978). 
     Farley seeks to enforce a specific regulation which states that 
grievance awards are 
binding on the local housing authorities and requires them to "take all 
actions, or refrain from 
any actions, necessary to carry out the decision [of the hearing 
officer]."  24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) 
(1994).  Her cause of action arises strictly under § 1437d(k).  Regulation 
§ 966.57(b) merely 
interprets that section. 
 
                                B. 
     Farley is a tenant of a building in Philadelphia that is managed by 
the Philadelphia 
Housing Authority.  She filed administrative grievances with PHA, seeking 
a number of repairs 
to her rental unit.  She also sought an abatement of rent.  Farley claimed 
that the repairs sought 
were necessary to prevent water from leaking into the basement of her 
rental unit.  These repairs 
included repair or replacement of the heater, replacement of the windows, 
repair of the holes in 
the basement walls, repair of the leaking pipe in the basement, and 
repairs as necessary to 
remedy the low water pressure throughout her unit.   
     An arbitrator held a grievance hearing and entered an award in 
Farley's favor.  The award 
stated: 
     1.   The Philadelphia Housing Authority shall inspect and             
repair 
all items of a non-contract nature within                   thirty (30) 
days of the date of 
this Award.  Any                   matters which require contract work 
shall be noted 
and       written advice thereof shall be provided Ms. Farley and          
her counsel 
within thirty (30) days of this Award.  All            contracted work 
shall be completed within 
ninety (90)              days of the date of this Award. 
 
     2.   Ms. Farley is awarded a Ten (10%) percent abatement of           
rent for the 
period July 1, 1995 through such time as               the requested 
repairs are completed.  The 
abatement                shall be credited to Ms. Farley's rent account. 
 
App. at 159. 
     The PHA did not make the required repairs; nor did it give Farley the 
rent abatement.  
Thereafter, Farley filed an action in the district court to enforce her 
grievance award.  The matter 
was brought for resolution in the district court by cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The 
PHA argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the 
award or grant relief on what 
was basically a garden-variety state landlord/tenant dispute.  Holding 
that it had jurisdiction to 
hear the matter, the district court granted Farley's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the 
PHA's cross-motion for summary judgment.  This appeal followed.  
                                  
                               II. 
     The jurisdiction of the district court to hear this matter and enter 
judgment on the 
arbitrator's award, is the issue on appeal.  The district court 
entertained subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 
1343(a)(2),(3),(4) and §§ 2201, 
2202.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review 
over questions of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court's 
grant or denial of summary 
judgment.  See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994); see 
also Jordan v. Fox, 
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994); Brown v. 
Francis, 75 F.3d 
860, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). 
                               III. 
     The PHA asserts that the district court had no jurisdiction under § 
1983 to enforce 
Farley's grievance award.  It argues that under the Brown consent 
agreement, the PHA consented 
only to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania state courts to enforce 
arbitration awards.  It further 
contends it had no reasonable expectation that it would be called upon to 
defend arbitration 
enforcement proceedings in federal court. 
     In support of its argument, the PHA states that the express terms of 
Brown incorporate 
the entire Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927.  It also points to a 
provision in the 1978 
amendment to Brown that reads, "[i]f either party should appeal an 
arbitrator's award, such 
appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Pennsylvania Arbitration 
Act of 1927."  
Stipulation and Order Supplementing and Clarifying the Stipulation and 
Order of June 14, 1974, 
App. at 55, para. 3.  The PHA argues that inclusion of this paragraph in 
the Brown consent 
agreement evidences the parties' intent to incorporate the entire 
Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 
1927.  The PHA further cites a provision of the Pennsylvania Arbitration 
Act that states, "[a]n 
appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or 
vacating an award, or 
from a judgment entered upon an award, in accordance with the existing law 
in respect to appeals 
to the Supreme and Superior Courts."  5 P.S. § 175(a).  Also brought to 
our attention is a 
provision from the Pennsylvania Act stating that all grievance awards 
"shall have the same force 
and effect, in all respects as, and be subject to, all the provisions of 
law relating to a judgment in 
an action at law, and it may be enforced as such in accordance with 
existing law." 5 P.S. § 174.  
In addition, the PHA cites to a provision that states, "[t]he provisions 
of this act shall apply to 
any written contract to which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or any 
agency or subdivision 
thereof, of any municipal corporation or political division of the 
Commonwealth shall be a 
party."  5 P.S. § 176.  The PHA argues that, taken together, the above-
cited provisions indicate 
that the parties consented solely to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania 
state courts to enforce 
arbitration awards.  We disagree. 
     The Brown consent decree is a settlement agreement between the PHA 
and its tenants.  
We, therefore, construe it as a contract.  See Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, 
Inc., 676 F.2d 77, 79 (3d 
Cir. 1982).  The scope of the Brown decree "must be discerned within its 
four corners, and not 
by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to 
it."  United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757 (1971).  Reading the 
above provisions 
(paragraph 3 of the Brown amendments and §§ 174, 175, and 176 of the 
Pennsylvania Act) and 
looking to the entire documents, we find nothing in the Brown consent 
agreement demonstrating 
that the parties intended that enforcement actions be brought exclusively 
in state court. 
     The Brown decree is completely silent concerning the method for 
enforcement of 
arbitration awards.  Paragraph 3 of the agreement does not incorporate the 
entire Pennsylvania 
Arbitration Act.  It incorporates the Act only insofar as the Act concerns 
appeals of the award of 
an arbitrator.  The issue before the district court was not the propriety 
of the arbitrator's 
resolution of the grievance, but only the enforcement of the award arising 
from that grievance.  
Looking to the four corners of the consent agreement, we conclude that the 
parties to that 
agreement intended that state court procedures would apply only to the 
appeal of arbitrators' 
awards, not the method by which awards were to be enforced.   
     Finally, we cannot accept the position of the PHA that the provisions 
of the Arbitration 
Act are automatically incorporated into every contract involving a 
Commonwealth agency.  SeePennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Sanders & Thomas, 
Inc., 336 A.2d 609, 615 (Pa. 1975) 
(incorporation of Act has occurred only where the contract contained an 
arbitration clause); see 
also Monte v. Southern Delaware County Auth., 321 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1963).  
In Monte, this 
Court stated that it would not "oust federal jurisdiction . . . merely 
because the Authority, as an 
arm of the state, is a party to this agreement."  Id. at 873.  We held 
that under the specific Montecontract, arbitration awards could be 
confirmed only in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas.  We found that the parties in Monte intended to preclude federal 
court jurisdiction because 
the agreement in Monte contained a provision that incorporated the entire 
Pennsylvania 
Arbitration Act.  Unlike the agreement in Monte, the Brown consent decree 
does not contain any 
such statement or any other indicia of intent to foreclose the enforcement 
of arbitration awards in 
federal court. 
     The PHA cites to DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500, 506 (Pa. 1971) for 
the proposition 
that statutory and regulatory provisions of law in force at the time the 
Brown consent decree was 
entered became part of that agreement with the same effect as if expressly 
incorporated in its 
terms.  Unlike the instant case, DePaul involved a constitutional 
challenge to the Pennsylvania 
Rent Withholding Act.  The appellants in that case claimed the Act 
unconstitutionally impaired 
the obligation of contracts.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected 
their claim, stating, "[a]s 
applied to leases entered into or renewed after the effective date of the 
Act, there can be no 
‘impairment', for the laws in force when a contract is entered into become 
part of the obligation 
of contract ‘with the same effect as if expressly incorporated in its 
terms.'"  Id. (quoting Beaver 
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 187 A. 481, 484 (Pa. 1936)).  The 
court went on to 
say, "[w]ith regard to leases that predate the effective date of the Act, 
it must be borne in mind 
that ‘the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts 
does not prevent the state 
from exercising such powers as . . . are necessary for the general good of 
the public, though 
contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be 
affected.'"  Id. (quoting 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437, 54 S.Ct. 231, 240 
(1934)) (alteration 
in original).  
     The resolution in DePaul is not precedent for the instant case.  We 
do not conclude that 
the Brown consent decree  automatically incorporates the Pennsylvania 
Arbitration Act.  In order 
to determine whether the Pennsylvania Act was incorporated into the Brown 
consent decree we 
must consider the intent of the parties.  See Halderman v. Pennhurst State 
School & Hosp., 901 
F.2d 311, 322 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850, 111 S.Ct. 140 (1990).  
Nothing in Brownevidences the intent of the parties to incorporate the 
entire Pennsylvania Act.  Even if the parties 
did intend to incorporate the entire Pennsylvania Act, (which we do not 
believe they did), the 
Pennsylvania Arbitration Act, like the Brown consent decree, does not 
contain any provisions or 
procedures regarding enforcement.  The Act provides only that awards that 
have been confirmed, 
modified or corrected shall be judgments which "may be enforced as such in 
accordance with 
existing law."  5 P.S. § 174.  Nothing in the Act requires PHA tenants to 
enforce their awards in 
state court.   
 
                               IV. 
     Section 1983 provides a remedial device to enforce rights under the 
United States 
Constitution and federal law.  In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8, 100 
S.Ct. 2502, 2506 
(1980), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may invoke § 1983 to 
redress violations of federal 
statutory law by state actors.  The Supreme Court has set forth two 
exceptions to this general 
rule.  See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 
S.Ct. 1531 (1981); 
see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 
453 U.S. 1, 101 
S.Ct. 2615 (1981). The Pennhurst exception applies where the statute did 
not create enforceable 
rights within the meaning of § 1983.  Pennhurst holds that Congress must 
have intended for the 
federal statute at issue to create enforceable rights in the private 
party, not for it to merely state a 
preference or policy declaration.  Id. at 19, 101 S.Ct. at 1541.  Under 
the Sea Clammersexception, § 1983 cannot be invoked if Congress manifested 
in the statute itself an intent to 
foreclose its private enforcement.  In Sea Clammers, the Court found that 
in enacting the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
Congress devised comprehensive remedial schemes that provided for private 
actions and left no 
room for additional private remedies under § 1983.  See also Smith v. 
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3469 (1984)(indicating that a § 1983 action would be 
inconsistent with 
Congress' carefully tailored remedial scheme in the Education of the 
Handicapped Act).  
     Following this framework, we look to the Pennhurst and Sea Clammers 
exceptions to 
determine whether Farley has an enforceable federal right.  In doing so, 
we must analyze the 
relevant statutory provisions "in light of the entire legislative 
enactment."  Suter v. Artist, M., 
503 U.S 347, 357, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1367 (1992).  We must determine whether 
Congress intended 
the statutory provision to benefit the plaintiff.  See Golden State 
Transit Corp. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448 (1989).  Further, the 
statutory language must be 
mandatory, not merely precatory in nature.  Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18, 101 
S.Ct. at 1540.  
Finally, the right may not be "‘too vague and amorphous' to be ‘beyond the 
competence of the 
judiciary to enforce.'"  Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106, 110 S.Ct. at 448 
(quoting Wright v. City 
of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 
S.Ct. 766, 774-75 
(1987)). 
 
                                A. 
     Farley's § 1983 claim does not fall within the Pennhurst exception.  
We conclude that by 
enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k), Congress intended to give public housing 
tenants a right to 
enforceable grievance awards.  First, Farley, as a public housing tenant, 
is an intended 
beneficiary of the procedures outlined in § 1437d(k) and its accompanying 
HUD regulations.  In 
another case involving the very same issue, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of 
Columbia examined the legislative history of § 1437d(k), as well as the 
enforcement history of 
the circulars that § 1437d(k) codified.  See Samuels v. District of 
Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985).  The Samuels court found "Congress clearly intended to require 
local PHAs to 
provide an administrative grievance procedure for tenant complaints of 
adverse PHA action, and 
nothing in the structure or history of the [Housing] Act indicates that 
Congress intended to 
foreclose private enforcement of that obligation."  Id. at 198.  Samuels 
also found support in the 
fact that the provision "uniformly speaks of a tenant's entitlement to 
particular procedural 
protections in the face of adverse PHA action."  Id. at 197.  
     Second, the language of § 1437d(k) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) is 
mandatory, specific, and 
clear.  The language is not too vague or amorphous to be enforced by 
courts.  The Samuels court 
noted that before the codification of § 1437d(k), several courts of appeal 
entertained tenant 
challenges to PHA action and inaction under the original grievance 
procedures as set forth in the 
circulars that pre-dated § 1437d(k).  See Samuels, 770 F.2d at 198.  These 
courts uniformly held 
that the grievance procedures were mandatory and binding on the PHAs.  Id.  
Likewise, we 
conclude that in enacting the grievance procedure under the Housing Act, 
Congress intended to 
impose mandatory obligations on PHAs.  Section 1437d(k) and the 
accompanying regulations 
plainly set forth the grievance procedure that PHAs must follow.  Section 
1437d(k) is not a 
general policy section or a "'nudge in the preferred direction[].'"  
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19, 101 
S.Ct. at 1541 (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413, 90 S. Ct. 1207, 
1218 (1970)) 
(alteration added).  Rather, § 1437 confers enforceable rights within the 
meaning of Pennhurstand § 1983.     
 
                                B. 
     Farley's claim also does not fall within the Sea Clammers exception.  
The Supreme Court 
has held that in enacting the U.S. Housing Act, Congress did not 
specifically foreclose a § 1983 
remedy by enactment of a comprehensive scheme of remedial mechanisms.  See 
Wright v. City 
of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766 
(1987).  Although 
Wright dealt with the Brooke Amendment, a provision under the Housing Act 
that imposes a rent 
ceiling on public housing, the Court also spoke generally about the 
Housing Act. 
     First, the Supreme Court cautioned that courts should not "‘lightly 
conclude that 
Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' for the 
deprivation of a federally 
secured right."  Id. at 423-24, 107 S.Ct. at 770 (quoting Smith v. 
Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1012, 
104 S.Ct. at 3468.)  The Court then found support in the fact that "HUD 
itself has never provided 
a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about the alleged 
failures of PHA's to abide 
by . . . HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the task of 
reviewing PHA grievance 
procedure decisions."  Id. at 426, 107 S.Ct. at 772.  The Court continued, 
"HUD thus had no 
thought that its own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it 
had established 
foreclosed resort to the courts by tenants."  Id.  The Court concluded 
that nothing in the Brooke 
Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing Act evidences that Congress intended 
to supplant the § 
1983 remedy.  Id. at 429, 107 S.Ct. at 773.  It also noted "the state-
court remedy is hardly a 
reason to bar an action under § 1983, which was adopted to provide a 
federal remedy for the 
enforcement of federal rights."  Id.  Adhering to Wright, we must reject 
the PHA's argument that 
Farley should have litigated this garden-variety landlord/tenant case in 
state court.   
     The PHA argues that Wright is "not worthy of reliance," and we should 
disregard it.  
Appellant's Br. at 17.  The PHA also implies that Wright has been put into 
question by a line of 
cases that has come after it, and is no longer good law.  In making this 
assertion, the PHA cites 
specifically to Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (1992).  
The PHA contends, first, 
that Suter changed the state of the law by announcing that Congressional 
intent is the most 
important factor in implying a private right of action.  We do not find 
this argument persuasive.  
Prior to Suter, the Supreme Court certainly found importance in 
ascertaining whether Congress 
intended to create private rights.  Indeed, in Wright, the Court based its 
decision on its finding 
that Congress did not intend to preclude a § 1983 cause of action for the 
enforcement of tenants' 
rights secured by the Housing Act.  Wright, 479 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. at 
771. 
     Second, the PHA argues that in the years following the Wright 
decision, the Supreme 
Court has disfavored implying private rights of action in spending 
statutes.  Appellant's Br. at 43 
(citing Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (1992)(specific 
language in the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, a spending statute, did not create a 
federally enforceable right 
under § 1983)).  Although Congress's key purpose behind the Housing Act 
was to provide 
funding for local housing authorities, the Supreme Court and other courts 
have found that 
Congress also intended to establish tenant rights.  See Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redevelopment 
and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766 (1987)(plaintiffs could 
bring a § 1983 action to 
enforce Brooke Amendment of Housing Act which imposes a rent ceiling); see 
also Samuels v. 
District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(plaintiffs could bring 
§ 1983 action to 
enforce grievance procedure under 1437d(k)); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of 
Father Panik Village 
v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316 (D. Conn. 1988)(plaintiffs could bring § 1983 
action to enforce § 
1437p, which mandates that local authorities obtain HUD approval of 
demolition).   
     Moreover, although Suter, like this case, involved a spending 
statute, the specific 
statutory language at issue in Suter is completely distinguishable from 
the language in  
§ 1437d(k).  Suter involved a provision of the Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), which provides that states must make "reasonable 
efforts" to prevent 
removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of 
families where removal 
has occurred.  The Court held that this language does not confer an 
enforceable right upon the 
Act's beneficiaries.  Instead, it found that the statutory language 
"impose[d] only a rather 
generalized duty on the State." 
Suter, 503 U.S. at 363, 112 S.Ct. at 1370.  By contrast, § 1457d(k) does 
not merely impose a 
general duty.  Instead, it mandates the very grievance process that PHAs 
must follow and details 
the rights to which the tenants are entitled.   
     The Supreme Court did not sub silentio overrule Wright in Suter.  It 
remains good law.  
Wright held that by enacting the Housing Act, Congress intended to grant 
enforceable rights to 
tenants of public housing.  Nothing in Suter or any other case alters this 
conclusion. 
 
                                V.  
     The district court was correct that it had jurisdiction to enforce 
Farley's public housing 
arbitration award.  Nowhere in the Brown consent decree did the parties 
intend to limit 
enforcement of awards to state court.  The district court was also correct 
that Farley, a public 
housing tenant, could maintain a § 1983 action to enforce her federal 
right to an enforceable 
grievance procedure as provided for in the Housing Act.  We will affirm 
the May 8, 1996, order 
of the district court granting Farley's motion for summary judgment and 
denying the PHA's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
